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Summary 
The paper examines the claim that international migration and increased ethnic diversity chal-
lenge the sustainability and legitimacy of redistributive welfare states. Immigration might poten-
tially lessen pressures related to demographic ageing, labour shortages in welfare services and 
the funding of future pensions in many European countries. The paper discusses three accounts 
of why a mutually beneficial relationship between immigration and welfare state sustainability 
so far has not been achieved. The first account claims that redistributive welfare states are un-
dermined because increased immigration-based ethnic diversity diminishes social solidarity. 
The second account argues that immigration, especially from non-western countries, threatens 
the sustainability of redistributive welfare provision because there is an unfortunate interplay 
between the level of qualifications of immigrants and the work disincentives created by fairly 
generous and accessible social security benefits. The third account attributes the problems of 
immigrants’ economic integration to discriminatory attitudes and practices of key decisions-
makers in the receiving countries, especially from employers and staff in employment and edu-
cational services. The paper questions the first of these accounts on theoretical and empirical 
grounds. The last part of the paper argues that there is a need for better longitudinal data about 
the employment contexts and work conditions of immigrants in receiving countries and the 
prevalence of discrimination, in order to enable an assessment of the relative merits of the sec-
ond and third account. 
Das Papier untersucht die Behauptung, dass internationale Migration und zunehmende ethnische 
Heterogenität die Durchführbarkeit und Legitimität des umverteilenden Wohlfahrtsstaates vor 
große Herausforderungen stellt. Allerdings kann Einwanderung in europäischen Ländern mögli-
cherweise auch Probleme der demographischen Alterung, von Arbeitskräfteknappheit im Be-
reich sozialer Dienstleistungen und der Finanzierung künftiger Renten abmildern. In dem Papier 
werden drei Betrachtungsweisen daraufhin geprüft, warum eine insgesamt vorteilhafte Bezie-
hung von Einwanderung und Tragfähigkeit des Wohlfahrtsstaates bislang nicht erreicht wurde. 
Nach der ersten Betrachtungsweise wird der umverteilende Wohlfahrtsstaat gefährdet, weil die 
durch Zuwanderung gesteigerte ethnische Heterogenität die soziale Solidarität schwinden lässt. 
Die zweite Argumentationslinie bezieht sich darauf, dass die Zuwanderung von Personen – 
insbesondere aus nicht-westlichen Ländern – mit niedrigem Qualifikationsniveau unverträglich 
ist mit den negativen Arbeitsanreizen, die durch recht generöse und leicht zugängliche Leistun-
gen des Wohlfahrtsstaates gesetzt werden. Die dritte Betrachtungsweise schließlich sieht die 
Ursachen der Probleme ökonomischer Integration von Immigranten in diskriminierenden Ein-
stellungen und Praktiken von Entscheidungsträgern in den Empfängerländern, wozu insbeson-
dere Arbeitgeber und das Personal in Einrichtungen der Arbeitsmarktpolitik und anderen sozia-
len Dienstleistungsorganisationen zu rechnen sind. In dem Papier wird die erste Betrachtungs-
weise aufgrund von theoretischen Überlegungen und empirischen Befunden zurückgewiesen. 
Im Schlussteil wird argumentiert, dass bessere Längsschnittdaten zu den Beschäftigungskontex-
ten und Arbeitsbedingungen von Immigranten sowie dem Vorkommen von Diskriminierungen 
erforderlich sind, um eine Einschätzung der Gültigkeit der zweiten und dritten Argumentations-
linie vornehmen zu können. 
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1 Introduction  
This paper examines the evidence for claiming that increased international migration and 
redistributive welfare states are incompatible. Recently politicians, journalists as well as 
academics have suggested that international migration undermines the solidarity founda-
tions of welfare states. Large, encompassing and redistributive welfare states of the Nordic 
kind are claimed to be at particular risk.  Even if they rapidly seem to become parts of the 
conventional wisdom, there are several reasons for raising doubt about the validity of these 
claims, both on theoretical and methodological grounds. The paper highlights these reasons 
by discussing different views on the relationship between international migration and the 
sustainability of welfare states, new empirical indications about this relationship and sug-
gestions for further research in this area.  
First, it can be observed that most of the existing cross-national comparative research on 
welfare state restructuring and reform does not attribute an important role to international 
migration or increased cross-border mobility1. Usually other factors are seen as more impor-
tant in driving changes in welfare states. For instance, Pierson (2001) argues that demo-
graphic ageing combined with a trend toward shorter and more compressed working ca-
reers, the maturing of welfare provisions, slower growth in productivity and changes in 
household structures are more significant factors than pressures related to increased eco-
nomic openness and mobility across borders. Others like Scharpf (2000) emphasises inter-
national challenges, e.g job losses in the industrial sector caused by the oil crises and inten-
sified competition, but do also point to institutional factors like employment-unfriendly tax 
structures, regulations protecting those already in employment and veto-points as obstacles 
to adjustment to the new external conditions. A number of scholars have stressed the inter-
play of factors like power relations between different political forces, social partners and 
other organised actors, as well as distinct cultural and ideological legacies, in determining 
the degree and direction of welfare reform (e.g. Huber/Stephens 2001). When international 
migration and cross-border mobility has not figured more centrally in existing comparative 
research on welfare state change and reform this may of course be the result of an oversight 
but could also indicate that other factors like for instance demographic ageing are more 
important challenges. 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
1  Important exceptions are Bommes/Geddes 2000; Boeri 2002; Tranæs/Zimmermann 2004 and Ferrara 
2004, 2005.  
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2 Does immigration-based heterogeneity challenge the solidarity basis 
for welfare states? 
Some scholars have discussed international migration as a challenge to welfare states on the 
basis on a set of theoretical conditions for establishing and maintaining arrangements for 
encompassing, generous and redistributive public welfare provision, giving concepts like 
social cohesion or solidarity a key role. By and large, they claim that solidarity and prepar-
edness to share risks or resources presuppose a combination of the following interrelated 
factors: 
o high degree of perceived homogeneity (“imagined sameness”), promoting mutual identifica-
tion among the members of the social system in question,  
o a sense of reciprocity or reasonable balance between contributing and receiving on the part of 
the members, and 
o territorial or social “boundedness” of membership and coverage, involving a demarcation to-
wards those who do not belong to “us”.  
The three factors have been given different emphasis or elaboration by different authors. 
For instance, Alesina and Glaeser (2004) emphasise the degree of ethnic homogeneity. 
They argue that Europe’s growing immigrant-based heterogeneity may eventually push the 
continent toward the lower level of redistribution found in the United States. They claim 
that American racial fractionalization can explain approximately one-half of the difference 
in the degree of redistribution between the United States and Europe. By contrast, Offe 
(2000) focuses on territorial boundedness, claiming that it is only among members of a na-
tion state that one can expect mutual trust and solidarity sufficient to support redistribution. 
Others have referred to the more general idea that a sense of common bonds, ‘belonging-
ness’ or attachment to a common national territory is a necessary precondition for commit-
ment to redistributive justice (van der Mei 2003: 5n).  
Both on theoretical grounds and on the basis of existing knowledge about the historical 
emergence of welfare states one may question the general validity of the combination of 
homogeneity, reciprocity and boundedness as necessary conditions for solidaristic or redis-
tributive welfare arrangements. Understood as an account of the conditions for the forma-
tion and maintenance of basic social units like tight and cohesive groups, small scale com-
munities, networks where members have close ties, and even spontaneous local welfare 
arrangements, it may be appropriate. It is, however, highly questionable whether this is a 
suitable or sufficient framework for understanding the mechanisms promoting cohesion in 
complex modern societies, where relations between people are to a great extent mediated 
and indirect, rather than face-to-face.  
The modern welfare state is a key expression of indirect and mediated social relations 
within a large population. The historical emergence of modern welfare states is largely the 
story of efforts to establish viable alternatives to local welfare arrangements based on social 
proximity and homogeneity. The latter had generally proved unable to provide sufficient 
protection against risks and contingencies in industrial society (see de Swaan 1988 on the 
failure of workers’ mutualism and Baldwin 1990 on homogenous risk community).  
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The alternatives to local and voluntary welfare arrangements had to handle and preferably 
prevent challenges like adverse selection, accumulation of risk and exclusion of ‘’bad risks’ 
and’ inferiors’ (people with lower status and less means). Thus the alternatives had to pro-
vide for complementariness of claims and resources to ensure a higher degree of redistribu-
tive effect. Moreover, given the greater mobility within industrial society these alternatives 
had to be national or at least regional in scope, that is, superseding the boundaries of local 
communities (Ferrera 2003, 2005). To the extent that the conceptual distinctions of 19th 
century classical sociology have any relevance today, the solidarity expressed in the modern 
welfare state cannot fully be accounted for by Durkheim’s (1984) ‘mechanical solidarity’ or 
Tönnies’ (1955) ‘Gemeinschaft’; the complementarity and heterogeneity associated with 
“organic solidarity” and “Gesellschaft” are equally important. Generally speaking, this im-
plies that the degree of perceived interdependence of services and contributions, and the 
resulting shared practical utility, may as significant as perceptions of being equal and simi-
lar, for solidarity and the willingness to share risks between a given number of actors. If so, 
a key issue becomes to what extent all the actors the question have a fair chance of being 
perceived as providers of services of contributions of value or utility for others (and through 
this, for ‘the society as a whole’). 
Like other sets of broad assumptions or axioms it is difficult to confirm (or falsify) empiri-
cally the reasoning behind the claim that perceived homogeneity or sameness is crucial. For 
instance, it is possible to make inferences from the results of small-scale group experiments 
within social psychology, but again the relevance of these inferences for understanding the 
working of large and complex systems like modern societies is questionable. Alternatively 
one may make inferences from cross-national comparisons of macro-level or aggregate in-
dicators as Alesina and Glaeser (2004: 133-146) do. They find a strong negative correlation 
between the level of social expenditure as a percentage of the gross domestic product 
(GDP) and their indicator of “racial fractionalization” in a sample of 54 countries, from all 
parts of the world and at different stages of economic development and modernization. 
They do not explain the rationale for using this particular sample of countries. Given that 
the modern welfare state largely emerged as an institutional system as a response to indus-
trialisation and urbanisation, it is also striking that Alesina and Glaeser appear not to have 
included variables related to the degree of economic modernisation in their analyses. More-
over, they do not present the statistical sources for their indicator of racial fractionalization, 
or discuss possible problems of validity and reliability, given that few official national 
population statistics use “race” (or even “ethnicity”) as a standard variable. Neither do they 
discuss how suitable the level of social spending (as percentage of GDP) is as an indicator 
of the degree of redistribution, given that the same level of social spending may be associ-
ated with different degrees of horizontal versus vertical redistribution. Finally, if one under-
takes an analysis of the bivariate relationship between their indicator of racial fractionaliza-
tion and social expenditure as percent of GDP, but limited to Western European countries 
plus the USA, it becomes clear that the only reason that one obtains a significant negative 
correlation between the two variables is that the US is an extreme outlier both in terms of 
racial fractionalization and level of public social spending. Yet, the views of Alesina and 
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Glaeser appear to have had substantial impact and their general arguments ought therefore 
to be taken seriously. The best way to do this is to examine empirically what implications 
these arguments would have if applied within the European context. 
3 Provisional empirical assessment of the relationship between inter-
national migration, ethnic diversity and welfare states 
In line with the kind of reasoning that Alesina and Glaeser represent one could formulate 
the following hypotheses: 
- (H1) The larger net inflow of immigrants, the stronger trend towards a decrease in the level of 
social expenditure over time. 
- (H2) The higher the proportion of foreign born inhabitants and in particular of inhabitants born 
in non-Western countries, the lower level of social expenditure a country would have.  
However, in the current public and academic debate almost the opposite relationships have 
also been suggested. From this perspective it is rather argued that high levels of social wel-
fare provision in European welfare states serve to attract migrants, especially migrants from 
non-Western countries (‘welfare magnets’) and that a growing proportion of immigrants in 
the total population will lead to greater demand for welfare provisions and thus an increase 
in expenditure, that is, the following hypotheses: 
- (H3) The larger the net inflow of immigrants, the stronger trend towards an increase in the level 
of social expenditure over time.  
- (H4) The higher level of social expenditure a country have, the higher the proportion of foreign 
born inhabitants, and in particular of inhabitants born in non-Western countries. 
A third perspective is that both these sets of assumptions are incomplete, imprecise or too 
simplistic. Arguably we need to take into a broader set of institutional and economic factors 
that may affect migration and its impact of welfare provision. We will return to some insti-
tutional factors later and will here concentrate on two economic factors; the overall level of 
economic affluence in a country and the overall availability of jobs in a country. Arguably 
potential immigrants’ perception of these two factors may be of greater significance for 
their decision to (seek to) move to a particular country, consequently we would expect: 
- (H5) The volume of net migration increases with the level of general economic affluence and 
decreases with the level of unemployment in receiving countries, and is only secondarily or 
marginally affected by the level of social expenditure in these countries. 
- (H6) The proportion of foreign born inhabitants increases with the level of general economic af-
fluence, and decreases with the level of unemployment in receiving countries, and is only sec-
ondarily or marginally affected by the level of social expenditure in these countries. 
Finally, it may be argued that change in and level of overall social expenditure in receiving 
countries are primarily influenced by other contextual factors like general labour market 
and demographic developments, and to less extent  by the volume of net migration or the 
proportion of foreign born inhabitants, that is: 
- (H7) Overall social expenditure increases with higher levels of unemployment and old age de-
pendency, and is only marginally affected by the volume of net migration or the proportion of 
foreign born inhabitants. 
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- (H8) The level of overall social expenditure depends primarily on the level of unemployment 
and old age dependency, and is only marginally affected by the proportion of foreign born in-
habitants. 
3.1 Data  
The data used to undertake this provisional assessment are compiled from different Euro-
stat, OECD and UN sources. The units of analysis are European countries. 
Net migration: The Eurostat provides estimates for the level of net migration in the EU and 
EEA countries. In principle, net migration is the difference between immigration into and 
emigration from the area during the years. As most countries do not have accurate or com-
plete figures on immigration and emigration, the Eurostat has estimated net migration on the 
basis of the difference between population change and natural increase between two dates.  
Here especially population change is likely to be somewhat inaccurate. With the necessary 
caveats Eurostat’s figures for net migration rates will used as the third key variable (Euro-
stat 2005c; EC 2005a). 
Foreign born inhabitants: On the basis of existing national sources the OECD has recently 
collected and presented new estimates for the proportion of foreign born inhabitants in their 
member states around the year 2000. This will be the second of our key variables (OECD 
2005b & 2005c). The OECD has also sought to compile national statistics about the country 
where people where born (‘country of origin’). Unfortunately, in some of the OECD coun-
tries this information is missing for a substantial part of the group in question, making it 
impossible to compare the compositions of national background of the foreign born be-
tween these and other OECD countries. For the remaining OECD countries we have sought 
to establish a figure for the proportion of the foreign born with ‘non-Western background’, 
that is, from Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean (excluding Europe, North-
America and Oceania). Again results involving this third key variable should be interpreted 
with caution, since there are uncertainties related to the registration of the country of origin 
and as this information is only reasonably systematic for 15 European OECD-countries. 
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Table 1:  Indicators of the volume of migration and diversity by groups of European 
countries 
 
 
 
 
 
Geo-political groups of Euro-
pean countries 
(A) 
Net migration per 
1000 population 
(mean 1992-2001) 
(B) 
Foreign born inhabi-
tants. Percent of total 
population around 
2000 
(C) 
Foreign born inhabi-
tants of non-Western 
background. Percent 
of total population 
around 2000 
Nordic countries  
Mean 
 
2.1 
 
7.2 
 
2.7 
Range 1.5 9.5 4.2
Continental countries 
Mean 
 
3.3 
 
15.8 
 
4.5 
Range 8.9 22.6 3.3
Mediterranean countries 
Mean 
 
4.6 
 
7.3 
 
3.0 
Range 8.7 4.7 3.0
Western countries 
Mean 
 
3.0 
 
9.4 
 
3.1 
Range 1.7 1.7 3.2
Central and Eastern European 
countries 
Mean 
 
 
-2.5 
 
 
3.0 
 
 
0.1 
Range 8,0 2.4 0.2
Explanatory note: 
Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) 
Continental countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland) 
Mediterranean countries (Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain) 
Central and Eastern European countries (Estonia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovenia, Slovakia) 
Sources: Net migration (Eurostat 2005c), foreign born inhabitants (OECD 2005b, 2005c). 
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Fig.2 Foreign born inhabitants of non-Western background in
European countries around 2000. Percent of total population
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As can seen from Tbl. 1 there is large spread within each of the main geo-political groups of 
European countries one these three indicators of migration and ethnic diversity. But even 
with this reservation it seems quite clear that the Central and Eastern European countries 
had less net (im-)migration and ethnic diversity than the other three groups of countries. In 
fact, most of the Central and Eastern European countries had negative net migration in the 
period covered (and that was before the EU enlargement). Luxembourg distinguishes itself 
by having an exceptionally high proportion of foreign born inhabitants, as well as a high 
volume of net migration (Fig. 1). Tbl. 1 does not, however, indicate that the Nordic welfare 
states with their encompassing and redistributive provisions have attracted more immigrants 
than the other groups (apart from the Central and Eastern European group). Rather the fig-
ures suggest that geo-political proximity to the borders of Europe, status as a former colo-
nial power or the level of general economic affluence of a country are more important than 
the generosity of welfare provisions in influencing  the volume of net migration or degree of 
ethnic diversity at the turn of the millennium. For instance, it is striking that the former co-
lonial powers France, the Netherlands, Great Britain and Portugal are among the countries 
with the highest proportion of the population with non-Western background (Fig. 2).  
3.2 Analysis and findings 
Does the volume of net migration affect trends in social expenditure over time (H1 
and H3)?  
First we adopt the difference in social expenditure (as percent of gross domestic product - 
GDP) between 1991-93 and 2000-2002 as indicator of trends in social expenditure (Eurostat 
2003b, 2005b). For the volume of net migration we use the mean of net migration rates in 
the period 1992-2001. We find a weak positive and non-significant relationship between 
these two variables (Pearson correlation: .18, n=16). Second we adopt the percentage 
change in social expenditure per inhabitants in purchase power standards (PPS) between 
1991-93 and 2000-2002 as indicator of the trend in social expenditure (Eurostat 2003b, 
2005b). We find a somewhat stronger positive but still non-significant relationship between 
this variable and the volume of net migration (Pearson correlation: .45 (n=16). 
Does the proportion of foreign born inhabitants affect trends in social expenditure 
over time (H2 and H4)?  
We find a weak positive and not significant relationship between social expenditure change 
in terms of percent of GDP and the proportion of foreign born inhabitants (OECD 2005b, 
2005c) (Pearson correlation: .22, n=16). If we use the proportion of foreign born inhabitants 
with non-Western background, the positive relationship more or less disappears (Pearson 
correlation: .12, n=13). Between the variable change in social expenditure per inhabitants in 
PPS and the proportion of foreign born inhabitants or the proportion of foreign born inhabi-
tants with non-Western background there is no positive relationship (Pearson correlations: 
.04 (n=16) and -.06 (n=13) respectively). 
All in all the findings presented so far do not support the hypotheses outlined above (H1, 
H2, H3 and H4). In other words these results indicate that the volume of net migration and 
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the proportion of foreign born inhabitants in a country are not important factors in explain-
ing reduction or growth in this country’s overall trend in social expenditure. 
What role does the level of social expenditure in a country play in explaining the 
volume of net migration? (H5 & H6)  
As indicator of the volume of net migration we use the mean of the net migration rates for 
the years 1995-2002. The level of social expenditure is measured by the percent of GDP 
spent on social protection (mean 1995-2002)2. Furthermore we adopt a country’s GDP per 
inhabitants in PPS as indicator of this country’s level of overall affluence (mean 1995-
2002). Finally, standardised unemployment rates (mean 1995-2002) are used as indicator of 
a country’s overall scarcity of jobs (OECD 2005a, EC 2005a).  
As expected there is a positive and significant relationship between the volume of net mi-
gration and the level of overall economic affluence in a country (Pearson correlation: .59, 
n=25), and a negative and significant relationship between the volume of net migration and 
the overall scarcity of jobs in a country (Pearson correlation: -.52, n=26). There is still only 
a weak positive and non-significant relationship between the volume of net migration and 
the level of social expenditure (Pearson correlation: .24, n=25). When we undertake a linear 
regression analyses with net migration as dependent variable, only overall economic afflu-
ence comes out with a significant effect (Appendix, model 1). 
What role does the level of social expenditure in a country play in explaining the 
proportion of foreign born inhabitants? (H5 & H6)  
Apart from the OECD figures for proportion of foreign born inhabitants around year 2000 
we use the same variables as under (III). We find a positive and significant relationship 
between the volume of net migration and the level of overall economic affluence in a coun-
try (Pearson correlation: .79, n=19), and a negative and significant relationship between the 
volume of net migration and the overall scarcity of jobs in a country (Pearson correlation: -
.60, n=20). Again there is only a weak positive and non-significant relationship between the 
proportion of foreign born inhabitants and the level of social expenditure (Pearson correla-
tion: .16, n=20). When we undertake a linear regression analyses with the proportion of 
foreign born inhabitants as dependent variable, only the overall economic affluence comes 
out with a significant effect (Appendix, model 2). 
The picture is, however, strikingly different when we focus on the proportion of foreign 
born inhabitants with non-Western background. There is a positive and significant relation-
ship between this proportion and the level of social expenditure (Pearson correlation: .59, 
n=16). Conversely we find weaker and non-significant relationships between the proportion 
of foreign born citizens with non-Western background and the level of overall economic 
                                                   
2  In this case social expenditure per inhabitants in PPS is less suitable as indicator of the level of social 
spending because of its strong correlation with the indicator of overall economic affluence in a country 
(Pearson correlation: .92, n=25). 
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affluence and scarcity of jobs in a country (Pearson correlations .43, and -.37 respectively, 
n=16 in  both cases). 
Yet, a country’s level of social expenditure does only to a limited extent predict its propor-
tion of population with a non-Western background (Adjust R square= .30). For instance it 
can be noted that five main colonial powers have higher proportions of population with 
non-Western background than their levels of social expenditure suggest (Fig.3). 
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Fig.3 Proportion of foreign born inhabitants of non-Western
background by level of social expenditure in European
countries
 
 
All in all the results in this section have broadly given support to the next two hypotheses 
presented above (H5 and H6). The factor with greatest influence on the volume of net mi-
gration is the general economic affluence of the receiving country, while the level of social 
expenditure has no significant effect.  When we consider a country’s proportion of foreign 
born inhabitants in general it is also the overall economic affluence that is the most impor-
tant factor, while the level of social expenditure has a minor role3. The exception to this 
conclusion is the proportion of foreign born inhabitants with non-Western background, 
where the receiving country’s overall level of social expenditure appears to have a limited 
but significant effect.  
                                                   
3  In this context it is interesting to note that in their analysis of European Social Survey data Coenders et 
al. (2005: VII) found that the level of GDP of a country had consistently negative effects of the degree 
of ethnic exclusionary attitudes among respondents; the higher the GDP, the lower ethnic exclusionism.  
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Let us again shift perspective again and ask what factors influence change in and level of a 
country’s social expenditure (H7 and H8): 
What challenges have affected trends in social expenditure from the early 1990s to 
first years of the new millennium?  
We have already seen that there are no clear and significant relationships between the three 
variables on migration and ethnic diversity at our disposal and the variable used for change 
in the level of social expenditure. Two factors that have figured centrally in the debate on 
public social expenditure are demographic ageing and unemployment. Demographic ageing 
means that a larger proportion of the population will require income transfers while the pro-
portion of the total population in paid employment will diminish. Thus demographic ageing 
has recently stimulated a number of reforms, for instance aiming to control the financial 
pressure created by pension entitlements, increase rates for labour market participation, and 
encourage people to remain longer in employment. Still in the short run one would expect 
demographic ageing to contribute to an increase in social expenditure. As indicator of 
demographic ageing we use the difference in old age dependency ratio between the early 
1990s and in the early 2000s. Here old age dependency ratio refers to population aged 65 
and more as a percentage of the working age population (15-64 years, cf. EC 2005a). We 
find a positive and significant relationship between the change in the level of social expen-
diture (as percent of GDP) and the change in old age dependency ratio (Pearson correlation: 
.53, n=16). 
Generally speaking one would also expect increased level of unemployment to lead to 
higher social expenditure, and vice versa. Again we find a positive and significant relation-
ship between increase in the level of unemployment between the early 1990s and the early 
2000s and change in social expenditure in the same decade (Pearson correlation: .74, n=17). 
When we undertake a linear regression analyses with the change in overall social expendi-
ture from the early 1990s to the early 2000s, we find that only the change in the level of 
unemployment has a significant effect (Appendix, model 3). 
What is the impact of the proportion of foreign born inhabitants with non-Western 
background, relative to other factors that influence the level of social expenditure 
at the turn of the millennium? 
In line with what we have found earlier there is a positive and significant relationship be-
tween the proportion of foreign born inhabitants with non-Western background and the 
level of social expenditure (Pearson correlation: .56, n=16). Moreover, in a European con-
text one would expect that richer countries were able to spend relatively more of available 
resources on social expenditure than poorer countries, and there is indeed a positive and 
significant relationship between the overall affluence in a country and its level of social 
expenditure (Pearson: .50, n=25). Other thinks equal one would also assume that the higher 
level of unemployment a country has the higher its level of social expenditure. But in our 
sample a contrary effect comes out as stronger; the poorer countries tend to have the highest 
level of unemployment. Consequently there is negative and significant relationship between 
the level of unemployment and the level of social expenditure as per cent of GDP (Pearson 
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correlation: -.49, n=26). We do however, find the expected positive and significant relation-
ship between a county’s old age dependency ratio and its level of social expenditure (Pear-
son correlation: 0,56, n=25). In regression analyses with level of level of social expenditure 
as dependent variable we find that the model with the greatest predictive power has old age 
dependency ratio and proportion of the population with non-Western background as inde-
pendent variables (Adjusted R Square= .53). Only old age dependency ratio has a signifi-
cant effect (Appendix, model 4).  
All in all the results presented in this section give partial support to the hypotheses spelled 
out above (H7 and H8): In the fairly short time span studied here change in unemployment 
is a more important predictor of change in a country’s level of social expenditure than 
change in old age dependency, while the findings suggest that the fairly crude indicators of 
volume of migration and ethnic diversity available here do not have any strong impact on 
change in a country’s overall social expenditure. On the other hand, old age dependency 
does have a clear effect on the level of social expenditure, but we somewhat unexpectedly 
found that the level of unemployment in these data was negatively correlated with level of 
social expenditure. Finally, the proportion of a country’s population with non-Western 
background does have an effect on the level of social expenditure, although this effect is 
weaker than the effect of the old age dependency ratio. 
 
3.3 Implications of the provisional analysis 
First it should again be emphasised that the results of this provisional assessment should be 
interpreted with caution, given the limitations of the data. But even if the results are provi-
sional and fairly complex they do suggest that many of the current claims that international 
migration and ethnic diversity in general are undermining the redistributive welfare state are 
too simplistic and unnecessarily alarmist. To the extent that migration, especially from non-
Western countries, does represent a challenge to European welfare states we need more 
thorough and detailed research about the mechanisms or causal processes behind this chal-
lenge.  In the rest of the paper we will briefly consider some possible mechanisms and how 
their interrelationships so far are insufficiently explored and understood. 
17 
4 Possible mechanisms behind migration’s challenge to European 
welfare states: (i) the interplay of disqualifications and disincentives 
A growing body of research deals more directly with the economic impact of increased in-
ternational migration on European welfare states. In general terms it is argued that high 
levels of economic affluence and incomes, and more specifically high levels of public wel-
fare provisions in these countries, are attracting migrants from non-Western countries. 
Moreover, it is often focused on different factors related to the particular historical circum-
stances of how immigration from non-Western countries started in the period of strong eco-
nomic growth after the Second World War - and later developed after the introduction of 
more restrictive regimes for labour immigration (e.g. a relative shift towards family reunifi-
cation and influx of refugees). It is argued that these factors have contributed to an unfa-
vourable composition of the population of first generation immigrants, and not the least, to 
a serious deficit of vocational qualifications in a great section of this population. This deficit 
has been reinforced by problems of judging the equivalence, relevance and quality of the 
education immigrants have from their country of origin, and many immigrants’ insufficient 
command of the language of the host country.  
Some scholars have also argued that the pattern of migration of ‘less productive workers’ to 
some Western welfare states has also been promoted by the relatively compressed wage 
distribution in these countries (Røed/Bratsberg 2005). 
As non-Western immigrants’ level of vocational qualifications tend to be low they have 
also tended to become concentrated in low-skilled and low-paid occupations or types of 
work. Relatively generous income maintenance benefits in the host countries might there-
fore function as disincentives to work for many of these immigrants (to the extent that they 
fulfil eligibility conditions, for instance regarding earnings, paid contributions or time of 
residence in host country). 
o economically inactive people, 
o unemployed, particularly long-term unemployed people,  
o poor people, and 
o people claiming and receiving public benefits. 
A growing body of statistical studies has documented these patterns (e.g. Bauer et al. 2000; 
Blume et al. 2005; Boeri et al. 2002; Bommes/Geddes 2000; Dahl 2004, 2005; Ekhaugen 
2005; Franzen 2004; Garson/Loizillon 2003; Gaasø 2004; Kirkeberg/Kleven 2005, Mogen-
sen 2000; Riphahn 1998, 1999, 2004; Rudiger/Spencer 2003; Røed/Bratsberg 2005; 
STATISTICS NORWAY 2004a, 2005a, 2005b; Tranæs/Zimmermann 2004; Wadensjö 
2000).  
At the same time there are striking differences in these respects between non-Western im-
migrants with different national backgrounds. These differences do not easily lend them-
selves to the kind of explanations indicated above, basically involving the net result of se-
lective processes of immigration, incentive structures and vocational qualifications struc-
tures. Rather these differences according to national background suggest that other or addi-
tional factors are important, e.g. possibly cultural factors, factors related to the particular 
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situation of different immigrant cohorts or related to various responses to immigrants in the 
host society. 
Through a combination of more comprehensive longitudinal or panel data and improved 
techniques of analysis we have now also a better idea about the ‘typical’ labour market and 
claimant careers of non-Western immigrants in European countries. For instance these data 
show that non-Western immigrants have difficulty in increasing their levels of income to 
the level of natives and Western immigrants. Available panel data tend, however, to be best 
on particular individual factors, for instance related to skill-levels, earnings, spells of unem-
ployment and illness, or macro-economic factors like the overall level of expansion and 
employment growth when the immigrant arrived in the host country and later.  
Dynamic data on changes in institutional or meso-level factors are, however, more scarce or 
missing, like the shifting demand for labour in the most relevant labour market segments, 
employers’ policies of hiring and recruitment, type of employment contracts and job secu-
rity offered, working time arrangements, health hazards exposure in different phases of the 
work career etc. Thus we know that several kinds of health problems are overrepresented 
among middle aged and older immigrants, but not to what extent these problems have been 
caused or reinforced by the work-related factors. 
In some cases this direction of research has also been elaborated in the direction of public 
opinion reactions and political responses to a situation where non-Western immigrants are 
overrepresented among the economically passive, the unemployment and recipients of pub-
lic welfare provisions. It has been suggested that immigrants’  level of economic inactivity, 
unemployment and benefit recipiency has led to or reinforced negative opinions in the na-
tive population towards immigration and non-Western immigrants, and that this may also 
partly explain the support for populist, anti-immigration or even racialist political forces. 
What we do know from a number of surveys is that substantial proportions of respondents 
reply that immigrants wishes to exploit and abuse public welfare provisions or too easily 
enjoy public goods they have not contributed in creating (Blom 2004b; Hellevik 1996). 
These negative opinions tend more frequently to be held by men, elderly people, people in 
the geographical periphery, people with low level of education and people with low income 
(see also Coenders et al. 2005). 
5 Possible mechanisms behind migration’s challenge to European 
welfare states: (ii) discrimination and social barriers to equal opportuni-
ties 
In recent years a third political and scholarly perspective has become more salient in 
Europe. Addressing many of the same empirical aspects of immigrants’ economic and so-
cial integration as the former direction of research, this perspective to some extent turns 
around the direction of cause and effect. It is argued that the marginal economic and social 
situation of people with immigrant backgrounds, and non-Western backgrounds in particu-
lar, to a great extent is the result of the ways in which key actors in receiving countries have 
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responded to immigration and new ethnic diversity. The key actors in question include first 
of all political and administrative decision-makers, employers and leaders of trade unions, 
but also the native population in general.  
The clearest examples of this kind of response occur when people of immigrant back-
grounds have been exposed to direct or indirect discrimination on the part of decision-
makers in the host country, for instance in the context of hiring practices (Rudiger and 
Spencer 2003; Røed/Bratsberg 2005). Direct discrimination means that people are put at a 
disadvantage on the grounds of their immigrant or ethnic background, through other peo-
ple’s stereotypes (‘statistical discrimination’), prejudices, ignorance or simply personal dis-
like of persons with ethnic or national background different from their own.  
But to the extent that responsible public authorities do not speak up against discrimination, 
do not attempt to inform and change the attitudes of people – or at least signal that some 
attitudes and behaviours vis-à-vis immigrants and ethnic minorities are social unacceptable 
– and do not sanction people who commit discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity, this 
neglect or negligence will in itself be a social obstacle to equal treatment of people of im-
migrant or ethnic minority background. Similarly, lack of attention and adjustment to the 
special requirements of people with immigrant background on the part of educational or 
vocational training institutions and their staff will also serve to maintain the disadvantaged 
position of people with this background. Many immigrant children’s and youth’s poor edu-
cational results cannot simply be attributed to ‘immigrants culture’ or lack of motivation, 
interest or efforts but might equally well be caused by educational system’s lack of flexibil-
ity, responsiveness and accommodation to the situation of immigrant children and youth, 
for instance their prior skills in the language of the host society. Some would also argue that 
lack of these forms of neglect or negligence amount to a form of institutional discrimina-
tion. 
A further aspect of this perspective is that it to a greater extent addresses the situation of 
second and subsequent generations of immigrants, and more generally, the situation of peo-
ple of belonging to ethnic minorities, both old and new. Hence this perspective more often 
deals with the variable experiences of individuals with immigrant background in the educa-
tional system of the host society and in particular the experience that even highly qualified 
persons with perfect command of the native language have in finding work in the labour 
markets of host countries.  
Data about the prevalence of direct or institutional discrimination on the grounds of ethnic-
ity or immigrant background are less frequent and less systematic than data about rates of 
economic participation, unemployment, poverty and benefit recipiency. A number of small 
scale studies of an experimental nature do, however, indicate that discrimination occurs 
quite often. For instance, these studies have shown that people with non-Western names 
much less frequently are called to job interviews than other job applicants, other factors 
taken into account. When the same job applicants have written a more native-looking name 
in their applications, they to a greater extent achieved to be interviewed (and in some cases 
even given the job). There are also examples of individuals with non-Western names who 
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have applied for legal permission to change their name after several years of unsuccessful 
job applications and then actually got a job. ILO has developed a format of experimental 
studies of ethnic discrimination but in several countries one has been reluctant to adopt this 
format for research ethical reasons (Røed/Bratsberg 2005). 
Nevertheless, with the advent of the European Union anti-discrimination directives of July 
and November 2000, most European countries have introduced stronger legal provisions 
against ethnic discrimination or are about to do so.  Together with the monitoring work un-
dertaken by the Council of Europe related to the incorporation and implementation of hu-
man rights conventions the monitoring and follow-up of the EU directives are gradually 
bringing forward more material about the extent to which people with immigrant or ethnic 
minority background are discriminated against. Public or semi-public supervisory and vol-
untary advisory agencies are also producing more case-material about ethnic discrimination 
at national level. 
In relation to what is often said about the traditional ethnic homogeneity of many Western 
countries (see for instance general statements about this from Alesina/Glaeser 2004) it is 
worth stressing that very few European countries are without long historical experience 
with various indigenous groups (Sami, Inuits), ‘old’ ethnic minorities or even groups with 
roots back to earlier immigration from non-Western countries (e.g. Jews, Gypsies, Romani, 
Sinti, etc). In addition to this, many countries have directly or indirectly a colonial past and 
been involved in slave trade (even to some extent Denmark and indirectly Norway). In the 
case of Norway the sizeable merchant marine that the country had from the end of the mid-
19th century and the greater part of the 20th century has influences many Norwegian to peo-
ple from Southern Europe and countries outside the Western world. It is also likely that the 
substantial Christian mission activity undertaken in Africa and Asia has affected the way in 
which people in Western Europe have perceived people from these countries. Altogether 
this suggests that the public opinion about people with non-Western or ethnic minority 
background has more complex preconditions than solely the recent experience with immi-
gration, and that the perceptions and mental schema that make ethnic discrimination possi-
ble is likely to have a long prehistory. 
Finally, one would on the basis of this perspective raise critical questions about the role of 
the mass media in confirming, maintaining and even reinforcing negative perceptions, 
stereotypes and prejudices against people with immigrant or ethnic minority background. 
Similarly, it would ask whether the framing and wording of questions in opinion surveys 
about immigration and immigrants express an attitudinal bias that will easily confirm rather 
than challenge people’s prior perceptions. For instance in a survey carried out in Norway in 
the mid-1990s one of the items presented to the respondents was: “Immigrants wish to 
abuse our welfare provisions and enjoy benefits they have not themselves contributed to 
create”4 (Hellevik 1996: 122). In the years 2002-2005 the Norwegian government depart-
                                                   
4  A somewhat similar item was included in the European Social Survey 2002-2003; “Taxes and services: 
do immigrants take out more than they put in?” (Coenders et al. 2005: 61) 
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ment responsible for migration issues commissioned the Statistics Norway to carry out re-
peated surveys with the same series of survey questions where one of the items presented to 
respondents was: “Most immigrants are abusing the social welfare provisions” (Blom 
2005b). 
In future research it is strongly desirable that the perspectives emphasising the interplay 
disqualification/disincentives and discrimination respectively to a greater extent are con-
fronted with each other, empirically and theoretically. Only by balancing the two against 
each other we will be able to understand the interplay between the agency and choice on the 
one hand and the structural constraints and opportunities facing people with immigrant 
background in European societies. In order to do that we need more systematic research-
based knowledge about the discrimination and other obstacles to integration and equal op-
portunities created by the nature of institutional contexts and decisions of key actors in the 
host societies. 
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Appendix:  
Results of regression analyses on migration and social expenditure 
 
 Model 1 
Independent variables 
(‘predictors”) 
Standardised coefficient T (test value)
Level of social expendi-
ture as % of GDP (mean 
1995-2002) 
-,236 -1,22
Unemployment rate 
(mean 1995-2002) 
-,062 -,285
GDP per inhabitants in 
PPS (mean 1995-2002) 
,761 3,14
   
Adjusted R square: ,41   
   
Dependent variable:  
 
Net migration rate 
(mean 1995-2002) 
N=24   
 
Model 2 
Independent variables 
(‘predictors”) 
Standardised coefficient T (test value)
Level of social expendi-
ture as % of GDP (mean 
1995-2002) 
-,208 -1,285
Unemployment rate 
(mean 1995-2002) 
-,068 -,341
GDP per inhabitants in 
PPS (mean 1995-2002) 
,827 3,99
 
Adjusted R square: .61 
 
Dependent variable:  
 
Proportion of foreign 
born inhabitants 
around 2000 
N=18 
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Model 3 
Independent variables 
(‘predictors”) 
Standardised coefficient T (test value)
Change in old age de-
pendency ratio between 
the early 1990s and the 
early 2000s 
,241 1,19
Change in level of unem-
ployment between the 
early 1990s and the early 
2000s 
,622 3,07
 
Adjusted R square: 0,53 
 
Dependent variable:  
 
Change in level of 
social expenditure 
between the early 
1990s and the early 
2000s 
N=15 
 
Model 4 
Independent variables 
(‘predictors”) 
Standardised coefficient T (test value)
Proportion of population 
with non-Western back-
ground 
,394 1,94
Old age dependency ratio 
(mean 2000-2002) 
,505 2,54
   
Adjusted R square: ,53   
   
Dependent variable:  
 
Level of social expen-
diture (mean 2000-
2002) 
N=15   
 
